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1995 ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
HARMONIZING THE COMMERCIAL USE
OF LEGAL MONOPOLIES WITH THE
PROHIBITIONS OF ANTITRUST LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
That ideas should freely spread from one to another
over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction
of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to
have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by
nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible
over all space, without lessening their density in any
point, and like air in which we breath, move and
have our physical being, incapable of confinement or
exclusive appropriation.'
More than 150 years ago, Thomas Jefferson's private letter to Mr.
Isaac McPherson foreshadowed the contemporary, ongoing struggle
between antitrust law and intellectual property law regarding the
legal protection and regulation of intellectual property.2 Histori-
cally, antitrust and intellectual property law have coexisted
uneasily, with lawyers and the courts often treating the disciplines
as directly conflicting.3
1 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THE PORTABLE
THOMAS JEFFERSON 525, at 530 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
" That Thomas Jefferson would foresee the contemporary struggle between intellectual
property law and antitrust law is not surprising. Scholars know Jefferson as the Father of
the Patent System because he shaped the birth of America's patent scheme, including
authoring the 1793 Patent Act, and sat as the nation's first Commissioner of Patents. Levi
N. Fouts, Jefferson the Inventor, and His Relation to the Patent System, 4 J. PAT. OFF. Socy
316, 322 (1921-22). As the Supreme Court has noted, Jefferson, like the law, struggled with
the tension between America's aversion to monopolies and the need for economic incentive
to encourage innovation via intellectual property protection. Graham v. John Deere Co. of
Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 7-11, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459 (1966).
' Intellectual Property Guidelines Help Further Goals of Antitrust Law, 67 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1686, at 523 (Oct. 27, 1994); Charles C. Hsieh, Case Note,
Professional Real Estate: The Line Between Patent and Antitrust, 7 HARV. J. LAW & TECH.
173, 173 (1993); Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional
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This tension remains an issue for those who practice law in the
areas of antitrust and intellectual property, and the contemporary
prevalence of the conflict has attracted the attention of federal
antitrust enforcement officials. Last year, Anne Bingamen,
Assistant Attorney General and head of the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice, discussed the antitrust/intellectual
property law conflict in a speech at Stanford Law School; the
subject of Ms. Bingamen's speech is the subject of this paper, the
1995 Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter "FTC") and Depart-
ment of Justice (hereinafter "DOJ") Antitrust Guidelines for the
Licensing of Intellectual Property (hereinafter "Guidelines").4 The
Guidelines are designed to reconcile these two areas of law; it
appears that the intention of the FTC and DOJ is both to minimize
the conflict between these two areas of law and to maximize
effective law enforcement by emphasizing the common underlying
goals of both antitrust prohibitions and intellectual property
protections. This paper hopes to explain how the DOJ and FTC
will harmonize their antitrust enforcement with the policies of
intellectual property protection by first exploring the theoretical
goals of each area of the law, then highlighting the historical
background of antitrust enforcement in the context of intellectual
property, and finally delving into both the meat of the Guidelines
and their potential, real effects on the intellectual property
marketplace.
II. THE THEORETICAL GOALs OF ANTITRUST AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
The superficial tension between antitrust law and intellectual
property law is obvious upon first glance. In the most rudimentary
sense, antitrust law prohibits monopolies while intellectual
property law grants legal monopolies to producers of creative or
useful works. The language of the Sherman Act, the statutory
source for Antitrust enforcement, specifically prohibits "[elvery
Copyright Misuse, 46 STAN. L. REv. 401, 410-411 (1994).
4Bingaman Emphasizes Sound Enforcement to Reinforce Policy Favoring Innovation, 67
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1685, at 473 (Oct. 20, 1994); Antitrust Guidelines for
the Licensing of Intellectual Property (April 6, 1995), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
13, 132 (hereinafter "Guidelines").
376 [Vol. 3:375
2
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol3/iss2/6
1995 ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspira-
cy, in restraint of trade or commerce." Similarly, the Clayton Act
states,
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce,... to lease or make a sale or contract for
sale, of goods,.., whether patented or unpatented,
... where the effect of such lease, sale or contract for
sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce.'
Alternatively, the Constitution of the United States plainly states
that Congress shall have the power "to promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries."7 This textual incongruity at the foundational level
drives the initial wedge between these two areas of the law. The
courts, through subsequent case law, have only added to the
confusion by specifically noting that intellectual property protection
is not a per se violation of antitrust laws,8 while using the anti-
trust laws in other cases to circumscribe the power possessed by
owners of intellectual property rights.9
'Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
'Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988). The Clayton Act was passed in 1914,24 years after
the Sherman Act, to supplement the Sherman Act. While the Sherman Act prohibits
monopolies generally, the Clayton Act attacks anticompetitive practices even though such
practices may not involve efforts to monopolize.
" U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
'United States v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp. 118, 126, 110 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
399 (N.D. Ill. 1956) (addressing patent rights and subsequent licensing agreements allegedly
used to exploit monopoly power in paper towel industry, court said, "[a]ntitrust consider-
ations are not to override the limited monopoly conferred by a patent"); United States v. Line
Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 309, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 399 (1948) (holding licensing of patent
rights for electrical fuses not violative of antitrust laws and noting "[t]he Sherman Act was
enacted to prevent restraints of commerce but has been interpreted as recognizing that
patent grants were an exception").
' See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co., v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599, 89 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 462 (1951) ("A trademark cannot be legally used as a device for Sherman Act
violation."); United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 197, 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 808
(1963) (facing alleged violation of antitrust laws through licensing of patent rights over
sewing machines, court confirmed "[t]hat Act [the Sherman Act] imposes strict limitations
1996] 377
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This legal tension notwithstanding, the fact remains that
antitrust law and intellectual property protection have common
policy goals; in the broadest sense, both hope to maximize consum-
er welfare.10 In the context of regulating intellectual property,
both areas of law purport to maximize consumer welfare by
promoting investment in innovation and thereby facilitating the
introduction of new inventions, discoveries, and creations into the
marketplace.11 Intellectual property law achieves this goal by
protecting exclusive property rights in innovation 12 while antitrust
law seeks to ensure a vigorously competitive market structure.' 3
Guided by these big picture policy objectives, the DOJ and FTC
now recognize that the commercial usage of exclusive intellectual
property rights is often procompetitive; and the agencies are
conforming their enforcement policies to fit this reality. 4
The 1995 Guidelines juxtapose the common policy goals of
antitrust and intellectual property law as follows: intellectual
property rights provide incentives for businesses, artists, entrepre-
on the concerted activities in which patent owners may lawfully engage").
'0 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.0.; see Hanna, supra note 3, at 419; Paul Goldstein, The
Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CAL. L. REV. 873 (1971).
" Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1034 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Justice Department Seeks Comments on Draft Intellectual Property
Guides, 67 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1676, 182, 183 (Aug. 11, 1994) (Anne K.
Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Division commenting); see Loctite Corp.
v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876-77, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 90 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (discussing
patent system's and antitrust law's complementary goals of promoting innovation and
consumer welfare).
12 See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Intl, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992)
(noting that purpose of copyright law is "[to advance] public welfare through rewarding
artistic creativity"); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156, 186
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65 (1975) (stating that aim of copyright protection is "to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good"); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 974,
15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating "[t]he rationale for allowing patents for
new inventions was and is to encourage their creation for the benefit of society").
's Hanna, supra note 3, at 420-21; John Flynn & James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and
the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis
in the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1125, 1138 (1987); Eleanor M. Fox,
The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1140, 1182 (1981).
'4 Bingaman Emphasizes Sound Enforcement to Reinforce Policy Favoring Innovation,
supra note 4, at 473; Justice Department Seeks Comments on Draft Intellectual Property
Guides, supra note 11.
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neurs, etc. to innovate;"5 because the law assures creators of
intellectual property that they will possess an exclusive property
right in their work product, the market extends to these creators
the carrot of supracompetitive profits as an enticement to inno-
vate. 16 The consumer benefits from investments in innovation are
self evident; one need only consider how the American consumer
has profited from technological advancements in personal comput-
ing, medical science, telecommunications, and so on, to come to this
conclusion.
Moreover, according to the Guidelines, antitrust law similarly
hopes to promote consumer welfare, but through different
means.17  Antitrust strives to guarantee a healthy, competitive
market." A market consisting of numerous sellers all vigorously
competing for consumers' dollars maintains both price and output
at optimal market levels.' 9 The competitive market structure
therefore enhances consumer welfare by ensuring both that prices
of goods and services are not unduly elevated and that output of
goods and services is not unnecessarily restricted.20 According to
the DOJ and the FTC, antitrust enforcement in the area of
intellectual property licensing agreements will now focus on this
common goal of promoting consumer welfare,2 which suggests
that the government hopes to initiate cooperation between these
two competing areas of law.
This cooperative mindset prompted the promulgation of the 1995
"Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 974 (explaining that laws grant to inventors right to exclude
others from making and selling their inventions as means of encouraging innovation); Mazer
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,219, 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 325 (1953) (-IMhe economic philosophy behind
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' ).
', Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.0; Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 974.
17 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.0.
18 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.0.
19Hanna, supra note 3, at 420-21; see also United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S.
596, 610-11, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1972) (holding territorial sales restrictions imposed on
members of supermarket cooperative to be Sherman Act violation because it restricted
number of individual competitors); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343-44
(1962) (holding merger of shoe companies to violate Sherman Act because of its tendency to
concentrate market towards oligopoly).
20 Hanna, supra note 3, at 420-21.
21 Intellectual Property Guidelines Help Further Goals of Antitrust Law, supra note 3, at
1996] 379
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Guidelines. The Guidelines are an attempt to reconcile the legal
monopoly provided by intellectual property rights with the
principles of antitrust law, consequently ensuring more effective,
consistent enforcement of both areas of the law.' Officers from
the FTC and DOJ are working to publicize the government's
cooperative agenda for antitrust and intellectual property law.
According to Anne Bingaman, the Guidelines "will ensure that
sound antitrust enforcement will continue to serve as a catalyst to
technological innovation."' Echoing this theme, Willard K. Tom,
Counselor to Assistant Attorney General Bingaman and member of
the task force that developed the Guidelines, stated in a speech at
the Canadian Intellectual Property Law Institute that "without
intellectual property rights the incentive to invest and innovate
would be greatly diminished. That result would be contrary to the
very purpose of the antitrust laws, which is to promote the well-
being of consumers by spurring efficiency."24 Both of these
comments acutely capture the government's intention to shape
antitrust principles and intellectual property protection into an
integrated, cohesive enforcement policy.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Licensing agreements are a common creature in the area of
intellectual property law. These agreements link up the creators
of intellectual property with entities that possess the resources and
know-how to commercialize that property and to extract from it
whatever profits result.25 Although scientists, inventors, poets
and the like are the primary creators of intellectual property, these
individuals may lack the means for distributing the intellectual
property through the market for sale to the public. Instead, the
creator typically secures intellectual property protection, be it by
22 Richard J. Yurko, Intellectual Property Guidelines: New, Improved, And... Irrelevant?,
MAssAcHusErTS LAWYERS WEEKLY, July 17, 1995, at B9.
2 Justice Department Seeks Comments on Draft Intellectual Property Guides, supra note
11, at 183; Bingaman Emphasizes Sound Enforcement to Reinforce Policy Favoring
Innovation, supra note 4, at 473.
U Intellectual Property Guidelines Help Further Goals of Antitrust Law, supra note 3, at
523.
25 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.3.
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copyright, patent, or trademark, and then licenses out his or her
exclusive right in the property to a manufacturer, publishing house,
or other appropriate means of commercial distribution.' The
licensee pays the licensor inventor a fee and often royalties from
the profits as compensation for the right to market the protected
property. These agreements often draw meticulous antitrust
inspection because they transfer the legal monopoly over the
intellectual property from the hands of the creator to the hands of
the commercial licensee. The law has struggled over whether this
expansion of monopoly power is consistent with the policies
supporting intellectual property protection, or whether it runs afoul
of the antitrust laws' desire to maintain an open and competitive
marketplace. The courts have not provided consistent, thematic
answers to these questions.
During the 1960's and 1970's, the antitrust agencies closely
scrutinized intellectual property rights and associated licensing
agreements.27 The courts presumed that the owners of patented
or copyrighted works, by virtue of their intellectual property protec-
tion, possessed the requisite economic power for antitrust analysis
to become relevant.' In United States v. Loew's, defendants
owned copyrights on motion picture feature films and distributed
to television stations the right to show these films through
licensing agreements.29 The agreements conditioned the licensing
of popular films upon the acceptance of unwanted or inferior
films.3' According to the Court, the mere fact that defendants
held copyrights over the films sufficiently proved that they
possessed market power which, if improperly used, violated
antitrust principles.3 1
2Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.3.
27 Yurko, supra note 22.
Id.; United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45, 135 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 201 (1962);
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 621 (1977); Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984).
Loew's, 371 U.S. at 40.
Id.
S' Id. at 45-46 (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 77
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 243 (1948) and International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 75
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 184 (1947)). Using patent power in violation of the antitrust laws overlaps
with the doctrine of "patent misuse," a defense to patent infringement. Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). The patent misuse doctrine is
3811996]
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The law's suspicion and scrutiny of intellectual property rights
dissipated dramatically during the 1980s as the FTC and DOJ all
but withdrew from antitrust enforcement in the intellectual
property arena.3 2  Under the Reagan presidency, the executive
agencies viewed the economic incentives provided by intellectual
property rights as legitimate means of extracting the full economic
benefit from innovation. Intellectual property rights acted as a
"magic trump card" allowing many previously suspect arrange-
ments to proceed without challenge from the FTC or DOJ.33
The courts applied this laissez faire approach to intellectual
property licensing.3' Close consideration of market substitutes
replaced the judicial presumption of market power when the
property under consideration was patented or copyrighted.'
According to Justice O'Connor in Jefferson Parish Hospital District
No. 2 v. Hyde, "a patent holder has no market power in any
relevant sense if there are close substitutes for the patented
product. " ' By giving weight to the role of market substitutes for
the protected property, the courts were able to find that the owners
of the intellectual property rights lacked a sufficient share of
beyond the scope of this paper, but for discussion of the doctrine, see Mark A. Lemley, Note,
The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599 (1990) and
Richard Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act and Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 175
(1988).
32 Yurko, supra note 22.
3 Id. (referring to 1980's as "anything goes era" for intellectual property licensing
agreements).
4 1d.
See In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1112-13 (1980)
(stating that presumption of economic power resulting from patent or copyright is not
conclusive; market conditions, such as competitors' abilities to develop functionally
equivalent products, must be considered); A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d
673, 676-77 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[W]e reject any absolute presumption of market power for
copyright or patented product."); see 3 P.M., Inc. v. Basic Four Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1350, 1359
(E.D. Mich. 1984) (addressing alleged tying of computer maintenance services to trade-
marked computers and copyrighted software, court said neither trademark nor copyright
protection established market power).
' Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 37 n.7 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). In antitrust analysis, economic substitutes play a critical role in defining the
relevant market where competition is allegedly restrained. The presence of substitute goods
enlarges the relevant market and thereby decreases the anticompetitive effect that a
defendant's actions have on market forces. LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 16,
at 51-58 (1977).
382
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market power to prompt antitrust concerns." In fact, at the
height of the 1980's era, only the rare parcel of intellectual property
had no close substitutes so as to possess market power.'
The 1995 Guidelines appear to be an attempt by the FTC and the
DOJ to temper the extreme stances of these two preceding eras.
The Guidelines attempt to strike a balance between the overly
suspicious antitrust enforcement of the 1960's and 1970's and the
hands-off enforcement of the 1980's.3 9 By extending a plan for
cooperative efforts between antitrust prohibitions and intellectual
property protections, the FTC and DOJ hope to effectively enforce
antitrust principles where necessary while simultaneously allowing
intellectual property protection to serve its public purpose.
IV. THE GUIDELINES
The primary purpose of the Guidelines is to help potential
licensors and licensees of intellectual property predict what types
of conduct will and will not warrant antitrust investigations.4°
Ultimately, this predictability should assist businesses and their
lawyers when making business decisions that carry antitrust
implications. The Guidelines follow a highly structured format,
first articulating three foundational principles and then moving
into more detailed regulations. This section will consider these
three principles and will then highlight three of the most unique
aspects of the details of the Guidelines: 1) the level of scrutiny the
FTC and DOJ will apply when deciding whether to intervene with
an antitrust investigation, 41 2) a safety zone where the FTC and
37 This analysis is consistent with most protected intellectual property. For example,
Margaret Mitchell's copyright on Gone With the Wind does not provide her with monopoly
power in the market for fiction novels, nor does 3M's patent on post-IT notes provide the
company with monopoly power in the market for note pads. Only the most revolutionary,
pioneering patents for which no market substitute exists provide true monopoly power.
38 Yurko, supra note 22.
"Yurko, supra note 22.
40 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.0; Justice Department, FTC Adopt Intellectual Property
Guidelines, 63 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 2654 (April 25, 1995). Yet even with the purpose of
increasing the predictability of antitrust challenges, the Guidelines note that "these
Guidelines cannot remove judgment and discretion in antitrust law enforcement," Guidelines,
supra note 4, § 1.0.
"' Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.4.
19961 383
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DOJ will not apply antitrust inspections, 2 and 3) a new market
where the FTC and DOJ will begin regulating antitrust viola-
tions.43
A. THE THREE CORE PRINCIPLES OF THE GUIDELINES
The Guidelines begin by detailing three core principles that will
buttress antitrust enforcement in the intellectual property context.
For the purpose of antitrust analysis, the principles are as follows:
1) the enforcement agencies will consider intellectual property to be
just another form of property," 2) the agencies will not presume
intellectual property rights create market power of the sort that
instigates antitrust intervention,' and 3) the agencies will
recognize the economic benefits of intellectual property licensing
agreements, which often work to combine factors of production in
ways which are generally procompetitive and benefit the consumer
welfare.4
By stating that the antitrust enforcement agencies will not treat
intellectual property as fundamentally different than other forms
of property, the Guidelines are simply clarifying the position that
the agencies will not adopt a unique set of antitrust rules specifical-
ly for intellectual property. The Guidelines recognize that intellec-
tual property is unique from other forms of property in some
respects, such as the "ease of misappropriation";47 however, the
agencies believe that the flexibility of antitrust analysis can
account for these nuances without requiring a new or unique strain
"Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.
3Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.2.3.
" Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.0; ABA Section Offers Program on Antitrust and
Innovation, 68 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1708, at 477 (April 13, 1995) (noting
that Richard J. Gilbert, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, affirmed these three core
principles at ABA conference on Antitrust Law and Innovation Industries); Intellectual
Property Guidelines Help Further Goals of Antitrust Law, supra note 3, at 523 (noting
Willard K. Tom, Counselor to Ms. Bingaman, confirmed these three core principles in speech
at Canadian Intellectual Property Law Institute); Bingaman Emphasizes Sound Enforcement
to Reinforce Policy Favoring Innovation, supra note 3, at 474 (noting Anne Bingaman,
Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice,
confirmed these three core principles in speech at Stanford Law School).
"Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.0.
46 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.0.
4' Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.1.
384 [Vol. 3:375
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of antitrust law restricted to intellectual property cases."
The second principle reaffirms the judicial position espoused by
Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion to Jefferson Parish
Hospital regarding intellectual property rights and the possession
of market power.4 9 The enforcement agencies will not presume
market power solely on the basis of intellectual property protection
because there often are close substitutes for the intellectual
property covered by the patent, copyright, etc.50 The Guidelines
define market power in the antitrust context as the "ability
profitably to maintain prices above, or output below, competitive
levels for a significant period of time."5' By considering the role
of substitute goods in the consumers' purchasing calculus, the
Guidelines expand the relevant product market in a way that
reduces the likelihood of intellectual property rights securing
monopoly power. For example, if an inventor held a patent on
staplers, the agencies would not automatically presume that the
inventor possessed influential monopoly power because paper clips,
butterfly clips, tape, and other potential substitutes compete with
staplers for shares of the paper-fastening market.5 2 Additionally,
and again to the liking of advocates for intellectual property, the
Guidelines state that even where there is no close substitute for the
protected property, market power is not offensive to antitrust laws
if it is a result of a "superior product, business acumen, or a
historic accident.' 5 By openly accepting lawfully acquired monop-
oly power, the Guidelines create ample room for antitrust and
intellectual property rights to coexist.
Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.1.
See supra notes 36 and 37 and accompanying text.
50 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.2.
'1 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.2.
'2 This position is consistent with the current legal procedure for determining market
power in the absence of intellectual property protection. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962) (attempting to define market for everyday shoeware); Tasty
Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250, 1257-58 (E.D. Penn. 1987) (attempting
to identify market substitutes for snack cakes and pies).
" Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.2. This position is also consistent with judicial analysis
when intellectual property protection is not involved. See United States v. Aluminum Co.
of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429-30, 65 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 6 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that Alcoa had
abused its monopoly power, lawfully acquired by patent, in virgin aluminum market, but also
noting that mere possession of monopoly power as result of accident or "superior skill,
foresight, or industry" does not amount to unlawful monopolization).
1996] 385
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Finally, the third core principle states that the FTC and DOJ
recognize the procompetitive benefits of some licensing agree-
ments."' This recognition will restrain the agencies from challeng-
ing licensing agreements that display such attributes.' More
specifically, licensing agreements often work to combine the factors
of production (such as design, manufacturing, distribution and
marketing) in a manner that promotes consumer welfare.' By
allowing creators of intellectual property to integrate their work
product with the commercial resources of business entities, the
agencies enable the procompetitive benefits of such licensing
agreements to rebuff any antitrust involvement. Additionally,
intellectual property licensing agreements provide the licensee with
the incentive to invest in the license and to develop distribution
and commercialization plans without worrying about free riding
from competitors.57 The Guidelines recognize that if inventors
lacked the assurance that intellectual property rights would protect
their investments of time and ingenuity, intellectual property
innovations created through the efficient assimilation with the
factors of production might never reach the consumer marketplace
at all and, therefore, would not be publicly available.5" This
promotion of innovation, of course, is the primary purpose behind
intellectual property protection in the first place.59
These core principles demonstrate the receptiveness of the FTC
and the DOJ to the purposes of intellectual property protection, yet
they also communicate the agencies' refusal to retreat from
effective antitrust enforcement. In essence, the core principles
strike a balance between the historically divergent areas of
antitrust enforcement in intellectual property. With the core
principles in place, the Guidelines move into more specific details.
As noted earlier, the details that this paper will focus on include
the level of scrutiny that intellectual property licensing arrange-
ments will receive, the licensing "safety zone," and antitrust patrol
of innovation markets.
" Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.3.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.3.
'7 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.3.
"Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.3.
See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
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B. UNIQUE ASPECTS OF THE GUIDELINES
First, the Guidelines specifically address the level of scrutiny
which the FTC and DOJ will apply to intellectual property
licensing agreements when analyzing them for antitrust viola-
tions." Antitrust analysis applies either a "per se" test or a "rule
of reason" test for finding violations depending on the type of
conduct under consideration."1 In order to succeed in prosecuting
conduct under a per se test, the enforcement agencies need only
prove that the conduct occurred.62 Under this test, the courts
presume that the offensive conduct undermines the maintenance of
a competitive market.
Alternatively, under a rule of reason test, the courts consider the
degree of harm that will result to the market if the conduct is
allowed to stand.63 In essence, the courts entertain not only
arguments over whether the conduct in fact occurred but also
arguments concerning the economic ramifications of the conduct.
The Guidelines state that intellectual property licensing agree-
ments will receive rule of reason analysis unless the agreement has
"no efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity."64 By
0 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.4.
6 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices § 31-32
(1971); Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.4. (offering price fixing, output restraints, resale price
maintenance and horizontal market division as examples of per se antitrust violations).
62 United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (holding that naked price fixing
of sanitary pottery was per se illegal; reasonableness of fixed prices is no defense); United
States v. Socony Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (determining that fixing prices of spot
market oil was per se illegal; court in fact said that mere attempt to fix prices is per se
unlawful, even if attempt is unsuccessful); see also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that possessing monopoly power is not per se illegal;
rather, prosecution must prove monopoly power exists and either unlawful acquisition of
monopoly power or unlawful wielding of lawfully acquired monopoly power so as to restrain
trade), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
a See Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d 263 (applying rule of reason to allow Kodak to change its
film in manner that inhibited competitors in photo finishing market, and holding that Kodak
had right to benefit from its technological innovations); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana
Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (considering refusal of federation of dentists to
cooperate with insurers under rule of reason analysis); NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (applying rule of reason analysis to arrangement for TV
rights between NCAA and two TV networks); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23-24, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 497 (1994) (addressing establishment
of licensing fees for music by composers and publishing houses).
" Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.4.
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requiring the absence of any efficiency-enhancing effects (presum-
ably a situation occurring only in per se antitrust violations such
as price fixing, output restraints, horizontal market division or
resale price maintenance ) and thereby proclaiming that rule of
reason analysis will be the de facto standard, the agencies commit
themselves to taking the market and the procompetitive benefits of
the license into account before proceeding with an antitrust
challenge. This, of course, assures both licensors and licensees of
intellectual property that any agreement that is not "unreasonably
restrictive of competitive conditions"" is safe from antitrust
challenges. Obviously, the rule of reason analysis is more lenient
than a per se approach. When evaluating activity under the rule
of reason, courts typically consider factors such as the economic
effect of the activity on the marketplace,67 the structure of the
industry market," the market share or position of the defendant
parties,69 and the purpose of the alleged restraint." Thus the
Guidelines themselves ensure that intellectual property licensees
and licensors can arm themselves with economic information as a
means of warding off potential antitrust challenges.
In order for those party to an intellectual property licensing
agreement to benefit from the shelter of rule of reason analysis,
they should structure the agreement so as to present the procompe-
titive attributes the agencies view favorably. For example, the
parties can license the intellectual property in a manner that
integrates factors of production;71 creators of intellectual property
can license primarily to manufacturers or distributors. This type
of arrangement, termed a vertical arrangement,72 generally
promotes consumer welfare and increases efficiency by integrating
Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.4.
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911) (White, C.J.,
introducing rule of reason analysis to antitrust).
87 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRuST LAW § 5.05 (1992).
8 Id.
as Id.
70Id.
71Justice Department, FTC Adopt Intellectual Property Guidelines, supra note 40, at 2655.
A vertical relationship exists when the parties play successive roles in the chronology
of marketing products or services; for example, wholesalers and retailers or retailers and
final consumers. See William S. Comaner, Vertical Arrangements and Antitrust Analysis, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1153 (1987); Guidelines, supra note 10, § 3.3.
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successive factors of production.7 3 Licensees and licensors can
word their contracts so as to promote a procompetitive "purpose" or
to display procompetitive intent. Creators of intellectual property
can license to mass producers with small market shares, and
potential producers of intellectual property products can focus their
license purchases on parcels of intellectual property where the
manufacturing market has low barriers to entry and exit. Finally,
parties to license agreements can concertedly collect economic
information about their arrangement so as to advocate the
procompetitive effects of their licenses in a court of law. Each of
these courses of action increases the likelihood of prevailing in an
antitrust challenge against an intellectual property license where
the rule of reason provides the applicable analysis.
After addressing the degree of scrutiny that intellectual property
arguments will receive, the Guidelines then discuss the first of the
two new concepts that will pervade the antitrust/intellectual
property relationship, the "safety zone."7" Regarding the safety
zone, the Guidelines state that neither the FTC nor the DOJ will
challenge a licensing agreement if, "1) the restraint is not facially
anticompetitive and 2) the licensor and its licensee collectively
account for no more than twenty percent of each relevant market
significantly affected by the restraint." 5 The safety zone effective-
ly establishes a presumption that, barring facial anticompetitive-
ness, agreements between parties controlling less than 20% of each
affected market are not anticompetitive.76
One key to understanding the safety zone is grappling with the
term "facially anticompetitive." The Guidelines plainly state that
this term includes all commercial activities deemed per se viola-
tions of antitrust laws.77 (As noted earlier, per se violations
include price fixing, horizontal market division between competi-
tors, output restraints, and resale price maintenance). In addition,
"facially anticompetitive" includes other restraints that "always or
almost always tend to reduce output or increase prices" 7 even if
,' Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.3.
14 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.3.
," Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.3.
76 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.3.
" Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.3 n.30.
78 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.3 n.30.
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not deemed per se unlawful. Though the Guidelines provide no
examples of such conduct, they do refer the reader back to section
3.4, where the text states that per se analysis will apply to
licensing only when an agreement fails to provide any "efficiency-
enhancing" economic results. This supplemental language to the
definition of "facially anticompetitive," though ambiguous, should
not be cause for concern. Reading the language in conjunction with
the reference to section 3.4 suggests that the agencies were merely
trying to capture unforeseen or unfamiliar arrangements that have
yet to acquire a per se label from the courts. Two things are
certain: first, the requisite standard of proof, "always or almost
always tend to reduce output or increase prices," is an extremely
high burden for the agencies to meet; and second, the FTC and
DOJ do not use this ambiguous language to back away from their
section 3.4 proclamation that rule of reason analysis acts as the de
facto standard for reviewing intellectual property licenses.
The purpose of the safety zone is to encourage licensing arrange-
ments that the agencies perceive as procompetitive, primarily
licensing agreements between smaller market players, because such
arrangements promote innovation.79 The safety zone "seeks to
address widespread concern that small businesses and innovators
are hampered by antitrust uncertainty."' The agencies' concern
is that small businesses fear a looming antitrust suit following
their innovation and subsequent licensing and that this fear stifles
their incentive to innovate."' The safety zone removes the threat
of antitrust challenges from the shoulders, and the budget sheets,
of smaller market participants.82 The agencies recognize innova-
tion as being in the consumers' best interest; therefore, the safety
zone is consistent with the goals of antitrust law.
How the safety zone affects larger firms is less clear. The
Guidelines are careful to explicitly state that licensing agreements
outside of the safety zone are not, automatically, anticompetitive or
7 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.3.
'
4 Justice Department Seeks Comments on Draft Intellectual Property Guides, supra note
11, at 182 (Aug. 11, 1994).
"Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.3.
82 Yurko, supra note 22.
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in violation of the antitrust laws.' Though large market shares
will always attract increased antitrust surveillance, under the
Guidelines even large market participants will not face antitrust
challenges if they can show their licensing agreements are procom-
petitive." As a result of their size, however, showing procompe-
titiveness, or an absence of anticompetitive effects, will be more
difficult for firms possessing major market shares. While the
Guidelines state that "the great majority of licenses falling outside
the safety zone are lawful and procompetitive, '" large firms will
always receive heightened antitrust scrutiny. Nonetheless, the
safety zone establishes some concrete parameters within which
firms can license intellectual property with a degree of certainty
that the antitrust agencies will not interfere.
The second creative concept introduced by the Guidelines, and
the final detail of the Guidelines which this paper will discuss, is
the notion of the "innovation market."' The Guidelines discuss
this newly conceived market class in comparison to two other
markets more common to the antitrust lexicon-the goods market
and the technology market. As defined by the Guidelines, a goods
market, in the context of intellectual property, consists of the
products produced by utilizing the intellectual property or other
inputs used in combination with the intellectual property to create
the final product.8 7 The technology market consists of the licensed
intellectual property itself and any substitutes.88 This market
categorization separates the market for intellectual property rights
from the market for the goods in which the intellectual property is
used. Finally, the Guidelines define an innovation market as a
market for research and development on goods or processes not yet
in existence.89 In essence, it is in the innovation market where
intellectual property rights are developed, which are then sold in
the technology market, which are then used to produce goods to sell
' Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.3; Justice Department, FTC Adopt Intellectual Property
Guidelines, supra note 40, at 2655.
'Yurko, supra note 22.
s' Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.3.
"Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.2.3.
87 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.2.1.
"Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.2.2.
"Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.2.3.
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in the product market.
The novelty of the innovation market is that it is an area
previously unwatched by antitrust enforcement. By defining this
market class, the agencies are recognizing how intellectual property
licensing agreements may affect whether intellectual property is
developed at all.9° The FTC and DOJ will now begin to examine
the competitive effects of licensing agreements in innovation
markets and will pursue antitrust prosecution if a licensing
agreement impedes research and development in a particular area
or concentrates research and development in the hands of a few
business entities.91
C. THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE GUIDELINES
To understand the ramifications of the Guidelines, it is vital to
note that the Guidelines carry no legally binding power. For rules
promulgated by the FTC or DOJ to assert the legal force of
statutory law, they must be passed in accordance with the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (hereinafter "APA") which congressionally
grants to executive agencies the authority to create legally
enforceable administrative rules.92 The agencies did not draft the
Guidelines after the requisite notice and comment periods as
required by the APA to create "legislative rules"; thus a primer in
administrative law would classify the Guidelines as purely a "policy
statement" of the agencies.93 Policy statements do not bind the
courts, the public, or even the agency itself.94 Because the Guide-
lines are not legislative rules, the administrative principle from
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
whereby the courts defer to an agency's interpretation of its own
enabling statute so long as such construction is rational,95 does
90 Yurko, supra note 22.
91Yurko, supra note 22; ABA Section Offers Program on Antitrust and Innovation, supra
note 44, at 477.
92 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §
6.3 (1994).
93Id. § 6.2.
"Id.
"Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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not apply." In the end, the courts can dismiss the Guidelines
when adjudicating antitrust cases; private plaintiffs can reject the
Guidelines when deciding whether to initiate suit; and the FTC and
DOJ can ignore the Guidelines when considering the initiation of
an antitrust prosecution.
Despite the nonbinding nature of the Guidelines, however, they
still will have a real effect on antitrust enforcement. Prior sets of
antitrust guidelines best display the impact these Guidelines likely
will have on antitrust law. First and foremost, earlier antitrust
guidelines, such as the 1968, 1982, and 1992 Merger Guidelines,
have had the practical effect of channeling the analysis of agency
employees and limiting employee discretion, notwithstanding their
nonbinding force.97 In essence, such guidelines establish agency
procedures which gain an intra-agency inertia. Furthermore, the
courts have viewed the aforementioned Merger Guidelines as an
informal source of influence on antitrust jurisprudence." One can
expect the courts to treat these current Guidelines similarly. And
finally, the Guidelines serve an informative function." Market-
place actors will rely on these Guidelines as an accurate statement
of agency policy and will incorporate their principles into their
commercial activity. Each of these insights suggests that the
nonbinding nature of the Guidelines will only mildly limit, but will
not erase, the impact of the Guidelines on antitrust law.
V. PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS
Only after applying the FTC and DOJ Guidelines for several
years will businesses be able to accurately pinpoint their genuine
effect. Yet, their effects will be real. This section will consider how
the Guidelines: 1) touch some selected, practical business arrange-
ments between licensors and licensees, 2) shift the big picture
DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 92, §§ 6.2-6.3.
Philip Areeda, Justice's Merger Guidelines: The General Theory, 71 CAL. L. REV. 303,
306-07 (1983); Marc W. Joseph & Timothy W. Mountz, The Justice Department Merger
Guidelines: Impact on Horizontal Mergers Between Commercial Banks, 72 KY. L.J. 505,540-
41 (1983-1984).
" Areeda, supra note 97, at 306-07; James B. Dean, Agricultural Cooperatives" An
Update, 73 NEB. L. REV. 228, 235 (1994).
" Supra note 92, § 17.3 (1994).
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economic policy perspectives for the FTC and DOJ regarding
intellectual property in the marketplace, and 3) signal to businesses
what types of arrangements are offensive to antitrust laws.
A. EFFECTS ON BUSINESS ARRANGEMENTS
The greatest attribute of the Guidelines is that they give a green
light to many licensing agreements which are genuinely procompet-
itive but which businesses previously feared might compel antitrust
intrusion.' °° This section will categorically consider three types
of business arrangements where intellectual property protection
and antitrust law potentially clash: tying arrangements, exclusive
dealing, and cross-licensing.
In a tying arrangement, one party agrees to sell its product, the
tying product, only upon the condition that the purchaser also buy
a second product, the tied product.'0 ' Tying arrangements tradi-
tionally have drawn antitrust concern when the tied product is
protected by intellectual property rights, because this creates the
appearance that the seller is using its monopoly power over the
tying product to either carve out monopoly power in the currently
competitive market for the tied product or to coerce sales of another
protected, but unpopular, parcel of intellectual property." 2 Based
on this construction, proving an unlawful tying arrangement
requires a showing of market power in the tying product's mar-
ket,0' and older case law created a virtually irrebuttable pre-
sumption of market power if the tying product being sold or
100 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.2.
101 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
102 See Hanna, supra note 3, at 411; Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488
(1942) (considering use of patented salt depositing machines to restrain competition in
market for unpatented salt tablets); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131
(1948) (holding "block booking" to be violative of antitrust laws as tying arrangement where
licensor licenses one film on condition that exhibitor will also buy license for another or
several other films); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying leases
for patented industrial salt machines to purchases of unpatented industrial grade salt was
violation of antitrust laws because defendant corporation used patent on machine to garner
market power in salt market).
'03 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 18 (1984) (addressing alleged
tying of anesthesiological services to general hospital services); United States v. Loew's, Inc.,
371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
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licensed was protected by intellectual property rights."' 4 Scholars
have criticized this presumption of market power, typically because
intellectual property protection grants only a monopoly over the
specific product; such protection neither prohibits competing or
substitute products, nor does it create consumer demand for the
protected property.0 5
The Guidelines retreat from the historic common law position
and specifically embrace the scholars' arguments, stating that there
is no presumption of market power resulting solely from the
intellectual property protection."°  The Guidelines note that
substitutes for products protected by intellectual property rights
often prevent the exercise of true monopolistic power in a relevant
market, that is, the market that the agencies and the courts
consider when analyzing a company's behavior under the antitrust
laws. 10 7  Considering the substitutes to intellectual property
squares with more recent case law where courts have, although
with some trepidation, allowed evidence of market conditions to
enter the judicial consideration of tying arrangements.' 8 Now
that substitute products and market conditions enter the judicial
calculus for evaluating tying arrangements, the Guidelines identify
the proper inquiries for the FTC and DOJ to be: 1) whether the
seller has market power in the tying product market;'O° 2) wheth-
er the arrangement hurts competition in tied product market;" 0
and 3) whether the procompetitive benefits outweigh the anticom-
petitive effects resulting from the tying agreement."'
'o Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45-46.
106 Hanna, supra note 3, at 432; William Montgomery, Note, The Presumption of Economic
Power for Patented and Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85 COLuM. L. REV.
1140, 1149-51 (1985).
106 Guidelines, supra note 4, §§ 2.2, 5.3.
107 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.2.
106 In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1112-13 (N.D. Cal. 1980)
(stating that presumption of economic power resulting from patent or copyright is not
conclusive; instead, market conditions, such as competitors' ability to develop functionally
equivalent products, are relevant); A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673,
676 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting "accordingly, we reject any absolute presumption of market power
for copyright or patented product"); 3 P.M., Inc. v. Basic Four Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.
Mich. 1984).
109 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 5.3
110 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 5.3.
..1 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 5.3.
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Tying arrangements stand the best chance to avoid antitrust
challenges when they exist between parties in a vertical relation-
ship or a relationship where the parties produce complementary
products, such as computer software and hardware, as opposed to
a relationship where the parties produce competing products.112
In fact, the Guidelines are designed to promote this type of
integration of factors of production by suggesting to businesses that
these types of arrangements will not be challenged." 3 The
Guidelines recognize that tying between parties in a vertical
relationship often does not inhibit competition that would ordinari-
ly occur, and instead is generally procompetitive.1 4 As firms are
relieved of the threat of antitrust intrusion, they consequently are
more free to innovate.
Exclusive dealing arrangements are a second commercial
relationship addressed by the Guidelines. Such arrangements exist
when a licensor conditions the license of intellectual property on
the licensee's agreement not to create, use, distribute, etc.,
competing products." 5 The Courts have routinely applied the
rule of reason analysis when faced with antitrust challenges to
exclusive dealing arrangements."' Such no-compete clauses
plainly foreclose new entry of licensees as competitors in the
licensor's market. Yet, with this term in the licensing agreement,
the licensor will have to compensate the licensee for the restriction
by reducing the price of the license." 7 This creates a cost savings
that the licensor can then pass on to the consumers. Reductions in
112 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.3. This does not mean that the agencies are certain to
challenge horizontal restraints.
1U Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.3.
114 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.3.
"" See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (discussing where
electric utility contracted to purchase all its coal needs for 20 years from one coal producer);
WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 8.03 (1992) (discussing
exclusive dealing contracts); Scott A. Miskimon, Intellectual Property: Divorcing Public
Policy From Economic Reality: The Fourth Circuit's Copyright Misuse Doctrine in Lasercomb
America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1672, 1694 (1991) (discussing compensation for
restrictive clauses in licensing contracts).
"' Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 236 (1st Cir. 1983)
(addressing contract where user of mechanical snubbers agreed to purchase three year needs
from single snubber producer).
117 Miskimon, supra note 115, at 1694; USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d
505, 510-11, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 959 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107.
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costs to consumers are exactly the type of proconsumer benefit that
the agencies, under the Guidelines, will consider in determining
whether to challenge the license as a violation of antitrust
laws."'
Recognizing such procompetitive effects of exclusive dealing, the
Guidelines immediately reaffirm the traditional application of rule
of reason analysis to these arrangements, and then establish a two
part test for rule of reason evaluation. First, the FTC and DOJ will
inquire into any anticompetitive effects of the arrangement, taking
into account the overall effect that the contract has on the relevant
market, the duration of the agreement, and market structure
factors such as barriers to firm entry to or exit from the market
and the number of market participants." 9 Second, even upon a
finding of anticompetitive effects from the exclusive relationship,
the Guidelines state that the agencies will consider countervailing
procompetitive ramifications of the arrangement such as promoting
the exploitation of the licensed technology, encouraging other
innovators to develop new technology or applications for existing
technology, or otherwise increasing competition in the licensed
product's market.12 In sum, the agencies are signaling an
unwillingness to strike too quickly at exclusive dealing arrange-
ments by asserting antitrust violations.
Finally, the Guidelines address cross-licensing arrangements or
"pooling" between creators of intellectual property. The agencies
commit to applying rule of reason analysis to some of these
relationships and to giving due weight to the procompetitive effects
of these arrangements.121 Under such agreements creators of
intellectual property license their product to one another or third
parties, thus the term "pooling," in an effort to jointly exploit the
property.'22 There are three primary antitrust concerns about
"l Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.3. This is not to say that no-compete terms in licenses
are always acceptable, see Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990)
(discussing anticompetition clauses as misuse of copyright), but the procompetitive effects
now enter the judicial analysis.
" Guidelines, supra note 4, § 5.4.
' Guidelines, supra note 4, § 5.4.
121 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 5.5.
'n Guidelines, supra note 4, § 5.5. HOLMES, supra note 115, § 14.01.
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pooling and cross licensing:' 23 first, that these arrangements may
collectivize the market for intellectual property and enable firms to
price fix, restrain output, or horizontally divide the market;
124
second, that firms may predatorially use pooling and cross-licensing
to eliminate competitors;"2 and third, that dominant firms in an
industry will cross-license or pool so as to reinforce their market
dominance and to exclude smaller competitors from effectively
competing. 26 When firms utilize pooling or cross-licensing to
accomplish a per se antitrust violation (the first concern above),
courts have applied a per se test prohibiting such conduct. When
a per se test or a rule of reason test applies to the second and third
problematic uses from above is less clear, but the courts have
allowed at least some pooling arrangements under a rule of reason
analysis.
12 7
The Guidelines both reaffirm the per se rule for pooling/cross-
licensing when used to commit per se antitrust violations"2 and
also highlight some analytical factors that will assist application of
the rule of reason test to pooling and cross-licensing. The Guide-
lines note that pooling allows the integration of technologies, the
reduction of transaction costs, the harnessing of economies of scale,
and the avoidance of intellectual property infringement litiga-
tion.1'9
Alternatively, the Guidelines label as anticompetitive pooling
that occurs where the pool participants have market power in the
relevant market such that the excluded firms, by virtue of the
HOLMES, supra note 115, § 14.01.
L' National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
85, 99-100, 114 (1984) (holding arrangement for TV rights between NCAA and two TV
networks violated Sherman Act because it enabled parties to fix prices paid to schools and
to restrict number of broadcasts); see also, United States v. New Wrinkle Inc., 342 U.S. 371,
380, 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 158 (1952) (holding that companies owning competing patents in
enamel finish violated Sherman Act by pooling their patents in order to fix prices).
United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175 (1963) (addressing pooling of
patents by sewing machine manufacturers in effort to drive out Japanese competition).
u* United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304, 311, 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 421 (E.D.
Mich. 1951), affd, 343 U.S. 444 (1952) (holding as violation of antitrust laws license of patent
on concrete block machine granted to industry's two dominant firms and requiring their
mutual consent before any small companies could license to patent).
' Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1979).
128 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 5.5.
129 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 5.5.
398 [Vol. 3:375
24
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol3/iss2/6
1995 ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
exclusion, cannot effectively compete in the marketplace.13
Furthermore, the Guidelines note that pooling resources in an
innovation market creates an incentive for individual firms to free
ride on the efforts of their pool partners. 131  In sum, the
Guidelines's commentary on pooling and cross-licensing does not
eliminate the unclear intricacies of this complicated area of
antitrust law, but it does voice government recognition of the
numerous procompetitive effects of pooling and commit the FTC
and DOJ to account for these efficiency-enhancing effects prior to
challenging a pooling or cross-licensing arrangement.
B. CHANGES IN ECONOMIC POLICY PERSPECTIVES
The Guidelines encourage the agencies and invite the courts to
consider a diverse scope of economic factors when reviewing
intellectual property licensing. As with most products, consumers
of intellectual property make purchasing decisions based on
numerous factors, price being only one of them.13 2 Intellectual
property products, such as computer software, are not fungible and
do not compete primarily on price, but rather on product perfor-
mance, creative content, and functionality." Because computer
software and other high tech innovations may have very limited
substitutes in the antitrust sense,1 34 strict price competition
analysis may be inappropriate because the functionality of intellec-
tual property frequently dominates the exclusivity of the property
right.135 The agencies' willingness to weigh a variety of economic
factors appropriately reflects the practical realities of the consumer
market for intellectual property.
As a more concrete policy goal, the Guidelines attempt to develop
an antitrust sensitivity to the importance of innovation in the
American economy, a sensitivity that advocates of intellectual
property rights have claimed is absent from historical antitrust
"'i Guidelines, supra note 4, § 5.5.
11 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 5.5.
Hanna, supra note 3, at 431.
13 Hanna, supra note 3, at 424.
134 Hanna, supra note 3, at 415-16.
' Hanna, supra note 3, at 415-16.
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enforcement. 136  This criticism of antitrust enforcement typically
rests on a belief that the goals of antitrust law and of intellectual
property protection are not complementary and remain irreconcil-
able.137 According to this argument, intellectual property protec-
tion promotes consumer welfare by providing an incentive to invest
and innovate, namely the profits from an exclusive property right,
while antitrust law seeks to promote consumer welfare by ensuring
the dispersal of market power and vigorous price competition.'
38
By proffering the Guidelines, the antitrust agencies have attempted
to bridge the gap between antitrust's and intellectual property's
short-term goals by focusing on the common long-term objective of
promoting consumer welfare. 139  Using legal monopolies over
intellectual property to promote consumer welfare is consistent
with the very source of intellectual property protection, the
Constitutional command in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.140 For
innovation to occur, investors must have assurance, at the invest-
ment stage of innovation, that they will have exclusive rights in
their work product.'" The threat of free .riders or competitors
wrongfully seizing their innovative work product and driving down
its price below a level at which the innovator can recoup his invest-
ment would undoubtedly chill innovation."' Recognizing that
innovation advances consumer welfare, the Guidelines display the
FTC's and the DOJ's willingness to carefully consider the positive
effects of intellectual property rights before applying the bite of
antitrust laws. 14
3
Accordingly, the Guidelines may refute those critics of antitrust
" Hanna, supra note 3, at 422; see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee
Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677, 724 (1986) (noting competing
goals of intellectual property rights-incentive for innovation and public dissemination
intellectual product).
137 Hanna, supra note 3, at 420-21.
135 Hanna, supra note 3, at 420-21 (arguing that antitrust goals are not complimentary
with intellectual property goals and do not reflect reality of market for developing
intellectual property).
1'3 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.0.
14 [The Congress shall have Power] "To promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries" [emphasis added].
141 Dreyfuss, supra note 136, at 679-80.
142 Dreyfuss, supra note 136, at 679-80.
14 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.2.
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involvement in intellectual property markets who state that
antitrust should "consider the long-term dynamic effects of these
practices [patent protection] on firms' incentives and abilities to
innovate, rather than focus solely on their short term price
effects." 1" The Guidelines attempt to make just this sort of
adjustment to traditional antitrust analysis. There should be little
doubt that patent protection enhances market efficiency and
consumer welfare. The incentive of short term supracompetitive
profits compels firms to take the risk of investing in research and
development of new products, processes, etc. 1" The monopoly
profit incentive drives innovation. 1" These supracompetitive
profits, however, disappear in the long run as competitors reverse
engineer the invention and create substitute products,'47 thereby
driving the price to the competitive level.
The Guidelines hope to stifle the debate over what type of market
structure is best suited for efficient intellectual property develop-
ment by focusing on the procompetitive or anticompetitive ramifica-
tions of intellectual property licensing agreements rather than
strictly looking at market structure. 148 Some commentators have
argued that the development of intellectual property, at least the
high tech sort, is dominated by economies of scale making an
oligarchic market preferable, and more common, than a purely
competitive market with numerous buyers and sellers. 149 Accord-
ing to this argument, traditional antitrust analysis is therefore not
appropriate for some intellectual property markets because the free
144 Hanna, supra note 3, at 422.
14 See Hanna, supra note 3, at 422 ("The prospect of these temporary monopoly gains
drives competition among market participants to be the first to innovate.").
144 Dreyfuss, supra note 136, at 698-99. Often a first producer of an innovative product
can garner supracompetitive profits even without intellectual property protection. The first
producer has the benefit of secrecy (other firms often cannot replicate the innovation until
it is marketed), the advantage of difficult reverse engineering, a marketing advantage
(consumers often prefer to purchase from the first producer, believing duplicates are cheap
knockoffs) and the advantage of hesitant competitors who wait to see how the product sells
before investing in a competing product.
147 Hanna, supra note 3, at 422; see Dreyfuss, supra note 136, at 677 (citing 1980's
Presidential Commission on Industrial Competitiveness which reported that U.S. was
underinvested in research and development, partially because intellectual property rights
had eroded to degree that they no longer provided incentive to innovate.).
1" Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.1.1.
149 Hanna, supra note 3, at 424-25.
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market outcome will be a highly concentrated market structure
consisting of only a few firms."W
Alternatively, some commentators argue that larger firms are not
necessarily the most innovative. Though their resources are
generally more extensive, small firms are often more suited to
innovation because communication costs and bureaucracy costs are
lower and there is greater flexibility to take risks.15' Often small
firms have the means to innovate but lack the ability to handle the
production, marketing, and distribution of their work product. 5
2
Therefore, the argument goes, the spectrum of intellectual property
rights must provide incentives for small firms and small investors
in the business of innovation to participate in the market for
invention by allowing them to structure business relationships that
will afford monetary profits and will minimize the risk of losing the
exclusivity of their intellectual property rights."s  Small firms
rely heavily on licensing their intellectual property rights in order
to integrate them with the commercial resources necessary to sell
their product.' Therefore, tailoring the regulatory system to
assist small firms may well promote innovation.'
The beauty of the Guidelines is that they respond to both of these
arguments by providing a flexible framework that embraces the full
spectrum of market types. Presumably both of the forgoing
arguments are correct; the creation of some intellectual property
products best proceeds in markets dominated by small sized firms,
while other types of intellectual property progress most quickly
behind the force of major corporations. The Guidelines assure that
the FTC and DOJ will consider the procompetitive benefits of
licensing agreements whatever, and in fact in light of, the optimal
market structure. In the context of small firms, licensing agree-
ments serve two purposes. First, they allow small firms to profit
from innovation by selling their marketing rights to businesses
with the resources to commercialize the product. They also ensure
that the innovation has a channel to reach the consumer. The
150 Hanna, supra note 3, at 424-25.
"5 Dreyfuss, supra note 136, at 726-27.
15 Dreyfuss, supra note 136, at 729.
15 Dreyfuss, supra note 136, at 728.
15 Dreyfuss, supra note 136, at 680.
15 Dreyfuss, supra note 136, at 680.
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Guidelines grant firms the flexibility in licensing agreements
necessary to achieve both these ends. In addition, promoting
diverse participation of small business in the production of
intellectual property is wholly consistent with even traditional
antitrust analysis. For large firms, licensing agreements enable
the product market to ride the wave of economics of scale towards
more, and more efficient, innovation.
C. PROVIDING SIGNALS TO BUSINESSES
The Guidelines not only benefit developers of intellectual
property by applying a more flexible antitrust analysis, but they
also identify issues that are likely to trouble the antitrust enforce-
ment agencies. Most notably, the agencies will challenge licensing
agreements that impede competition that would have occurred if
not for the agreement." As a practical matter, this precludes
most licensing agreements between parties in a horizontal relation-
ship-parties that actually or potentially compete with one
another.'57 Licensing agreements between parties in a horizontal
relationship are not anticompetitive per se, just as licensing
arrangements between vertical parties are not guaranteed insula-
tion from antitrust concern. Horizontal relationships, however, are
more likely to attract antitrust inspection.'" The Guidelines also
preclude licensing agreements that set restrictions on purchasing
Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.1 (noting agreements that facilitate price fixing or market
division, or hinder competition in other markets by closing access to or raising price of
components/inputs are likely to draw antitrust attention; this attention, however, will follow
Guidelines and will only result in actual antitrust challenge if activity is facially anticompeti-
tive or unreasonably restrains trade); see ABA Section Offers Program on Antitrust and
Innovation, supra note 44, at 477-78 (quoting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Richard
J. Gilbert as he commented that agreements between noncompetitors are less likely to be
challenged "even if an alternate licensing arrangement could have created more competi-
tion").
"" When parties are in a horizontal relationship, they produce economic substitutes; they
are actual or potential competitors. When parties are in a vertical relationship, they
complement each other by combining factors of production. See Guidelines, supra note 4, §
3.1; Yurko, supra note 22 (stating that licensing agreements between actual or potential
competitors are not per se unlawful, but that they will draw traditional antitrust attention).
" Guidelines, supra note 4, §§ 3.3, 5.5 (noting that even horizontal licensing agreements
may have procompetitive benefits resulting from economies of scale in research and
development, production, and marketing).
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or using goods other than the licensed technology, as well as
agreements that penalize one party for dealing with producers of
substitute technology. 5 ' Such restrictive terms facially inhibit
competition that would have occurred were it not for the agree-
ment. Antitrust enforcement agencies will take issue with such
impediments to competition occurring in a goods market, a
technology market, or a newly recognized innovation market." °
Furthermore, the Guidelines offer some additional instruction on
the application of the safety zone's "less than 20% of the relevant
market" standard."6 ' In technology markets, if economic data for
determining market share is unavailable, entities nonetheless will
get the benefit of the safety zone if certain conditions exist. First,
there must be at least four other competing technologies in addition
to the licensed technology. 2 In addition, these technologies must
be both functionally similar to the licensed technology and offered
at a comparable cost.'6 In innovation markets, entities will get
the benefit of the safety zone if four or more independent parties
possess the ability and incentive to engage in research and
development that closely tracks the research and development of
the licensing parties.' Finally, although license agreements
outside of the safety zone are not necessarily offensive to the
antitrust laws," the very presence of a safety zone should
suggest to businesses that antitrust inspection may well follow such
agreements.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Guidelines do not reform antitrust enforcement in the realm
of intellectual property in a manner that effectively shields owners
of intellectual property rights from the antitrust laws. Long ago,
courts made clear that they would not afford antitrust immunity to
1 Justice Department Seeks Comments on Draft Intellectual Property Guides, supra note
11, at 182-83.
16 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.2.
161 See supra text accompanying note 75.
16 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.3.
16 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.3.
16 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.3.
1 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.3.
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intellectual property rights.'" This remains the case. In fact,
requiring those possessing intellectual property protection to
adhere to antitrust principles is consistent with at least the
statutory authority for patent rights. The U.S. Patent Act states
that nothing in the patent laws "shall be deemed to convey to any
person immunity from civil or criminal liability, or to create any
defenses to actions, under any antitrust law."167
Alternatively, the Guidelines do provide some effective tools for
harmonizing antitrust enforcement and intellectual property
protection. Indeed, the overriding tenor of the Guidelines should
encourage intellectual property licensing. By stressing the
procompetitive benefits of some intellectual property licensing
agreements, the Guidelines display an overt receptiveness on the
part of the DOJ and the FTC to some licensing agreements. The
more detailed aspects of the Guidelines, such as the "safety zone"
and the discussion of the relevance of product substitutes, not only
provide concrete, reassuring examples of activities that will not
suffer antitrust intrusion, but also offer helpful guidance for
businesses trying to avoid or limit the risk of violating the antitrust
laws. The Guidelines provide a degree of predictability to antitrust
enforcement that will assist the creators of innovation and their
commercial licensees.
Most importantly, the Guidelines specifically define the purpose
of antitrust enforcement as the promotion of innovation and
consumer welfare.1  The Guidelines are not radical. Rather,
they describe a middle-of-the-road, inoffensive level of antitrust
enforcement over intellectual property. By synchronizing the
ultimate purposes of intellectual property protection and antitrust
prohibitions, the Guidelines take a positive step towards ending the
tension between these two areas of law. At the very least, the mere
promulgation of the Guidelines suggests that the FTC and DOJ will
continue to enforce the antitrust laws in the context of intellectual
property rights.
THoMAs L. HAYSLETr III
'
0 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488,490-91 (1942) (holding that patent,
though granting exclusive right to make, use, and vend patented item, "affords no immunity
for a monopoly not within the grant").
167 35 U.S.C. § 211 (1994).
168 Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.0.
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